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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3873 
___________ 
 
CHANDAR A. SNOW, 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
B.A. BLEDSOE, WARDEN 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-00882) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 25, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: January 31, 2013 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Chandar A. Snow appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, 
we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. 
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I. 
 In 1993, Snow was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver cocaine 
base, and one count of knowingly and intentionally causing the killing of another person 
while engaged in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine.  The court sentenced Snow to life 
imprisonment, and ordered a special assessment fee of $100.00.   
Following an unsuccessful appeal in the Sixth Circuit, Snow filed a series of three 
motions to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Each 
of these motions was denied: the first because he failed to file within one year of the date 
his conviction became final; the second for failure to prosecute; and the third because he 
did not meet the threshold requirements for permission to file a second or successive 
section 2255 motion.  Snow then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2241, which the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed 
because Snow had not shown that section 2255 was inadequate or ineffective to test the 
legality of his detention. 
In May 2012, while incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg 
(“USP-Lewisburg”), Snow filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant 
to section 2241.  In the petition, he alleged that: (1) the Designation and Sentence 
Computation Center incorrectly calculated his sentence; and (2) the Bureau of Prisons 
violated his First Amendment rights by blocking access to the courts, where he could 
have his actual innocence claim adjudicated.  The District Court dismissed the petition, 
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finding that Snow failed to demonstrate that a motion under section 2255 would be an 
inadequate or ineffective remedy.  Snow filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions.  Vega v. United States, 493 
F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).  We may summarily affirm a judgment of the District Court 
on any basis supported by the record if the appeal does not raise a substantial question.  
See I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. Bledsoe
The District Court properly dismissed Snow’s section 2241 petition for lack of 
jurisdiction.  A motion filed under section 2255 in the sentencing court is the presumptive 
means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence.  
, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  By contrast, section 2241 
“confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging 
not the validity but the execution of his sentence.”  Coady v. Vaughn
We agree with the District Court that Snow’s claims are actually an attack on the 
validity of his sentence and, as such, must be brought pursuant to section 2255.  Although 
the habeas petition itself is unclear, Snow’s exhibits demonstrate that he attempted to 
adjudicate his actual innocence through the prison’s administrative remedy process.  
, 251 F.3d 480, 485-
86 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that challenges to the execution of a sentence include, e.g., 
challenges to wrongful revocation of parole, place of imprisonment, and credit for time 
served) (internal citations omitted).   
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Rather than provide Snow with such an adjudication, the prison’s Attorney Advisor 
notified Snow that the “appropriate course of action is to file a habeas petition with the 
sentencing court.”  Snow subsequently filed a new request for an administrative remedy, 
this time alleging that he had been tortured while on hunger strike, denied access to 
religious materials during Ramadan, denied the ability to petition the government for 
redress, and denied access to the courts for adjudication on the merits of his actual 
innocence claim.  After conducting an investigation, the Warden at USP-Lewisburg 
denied Snow’s request.  To the extent that the allegations in Snow’s administrative 
remedy request elucidate the claims raised in his habeas petition, it appears that Snow’s 
underlying purpose has been to challenge the validity of his sentence, rather than the 
execution of his sentence.  This purpose is further evidenced by the fact that Snow’s 
objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations essentially amount to 
a plea to have a court hear his actual innocence claim.  Therefore, Snow’s claims must 
presumptively be brought under section 2255.  See Okereke
However, a petitioner can seek relief under section 2241 if the remedy provided by 
section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.  
, 307 F.3d at 120. 
In re 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997).  “Section 2255 is not inadequate or 
ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute 
of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping 
requirements of the amended § 2255.”  Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 
536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  Rather, the “safety valve” provided under section 
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2255 is extremely narrow and has been held to apply only in unusual situations, such as 
those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for 
actions later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law.  Okereke, 307 
F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil
Here, as Snow acknowledged in his petition, section 2255 is not inadequate or 
ineffective merely because, on account of having already filed previous section 2255 
motions, he now faces the strict gatekeeping requirements that apply to successive 
section 2255 motions.  
, 119 F.3d at 251). 
See id.  Moreover, the cases that Snow cites in support of his 
theory of innocence – namely, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), Sibron v. New 
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736 (1987), and Rutledge v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996) – were decided prior to Snow’s previous section 2255 
motions and 2241 petition and therefore do not constitute an intervening change in the 
law.  Cf. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 247-48 (finding section 2255 to be inadequate or 
ineffective where the petitioner filed a section 2255 motion prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bailey v. United States
  In short, Snow did not show that section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to 
test the legality of his detention.  
, which made non-criminal one act for which the 
petitioner was convicted).   
Id. at 251.  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in 
dismissing his section 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction.  For substantially the same 
reasons set forth by the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
order dismissing Snow’s section 2241 petition.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
